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OPINION 
__________________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction1 allows a parent2 to petition for 
                                              
 1 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 
11,670, 19 I.L.M. 1501 [hereinafter Hague Convention].  The 
Hague Convention has been ratified by the United States and 
is implemented by the International Child Abduction 
Remedies Act (“ICARA”), 22 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq. (formerly 
at 42 U.S.C. § 11601 et seq.).  According to ICARA, courts 
must “decide [] case[s] in accordance with the Convention.”  
Id. § 9003(d). 
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the return of a child when that child has been removed or 
retained from her “habitual residence” country in violation of 
the parent’s custody rights in that country.  The petition at 
issue in this case concerns two children (A.D. and J.D.) 
retained by their mother in the United States who hail from 
the Caribbean island of Saint Martin.  That 34-square-mile 
island is comprised of two legally distinct, yet highly 
integrated, countries—French Saint Martin (where the 
children went to school) and Dutch Sint Maarten (where the 
children had their home).3  To complicate matters further, the 
Hague Convention is recognized by French Saint Martin 
(through France),4 but is not recognized by Dutch Sint 
Maarten.5 
                                                                                                     
 2 The Convention may be invoked by any person or 
entity that has custody rights over a child, see Legal Analysis 
of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494, 10505 (Mar. 26, 1986) 
[hereinafter Legal Analysis], but for the sake of simplicity we 
will refer to the “parent” of a child as invoking the 
Convention. 
 3 We will use the term “Saint Martin” to refer to the 
entire island, “French Saint Martin” to refer to the French 
country, and “Dutch Sint Maarten” to refer to the Dutch 
country. 
 
 4 See France—Declarations/Reservations, Convention 
of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction, 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-
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 The extraordinary facts of this case require us to 
decide an issue of first impression:  may a child have two 
“habitual residence” countries at the same time under the 
                                                                                                     
table/notifications/?csid=619&disp=resdn (“[T]he 
Government declares that the Convention shall extend to the 
whole of the territory of the French Republic.”). 
 5 See Netherlands—Declarations/Reservations, 
Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction, 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-
table/notifications/?csid=634&disp=resdn; Netherlands—
Extensions, Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction, 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-
table/extensions/?cid=24&mid=634; Netherlands Ministry of 
Security and Justice, Guide for International Cases of Child 
Abduction to Foreign Countries (May 2016), 
https://www.government.nl/binaries/government/documents/l
eaflets/2014/04/15/guide-for-international-cases-of-child-
abduction-to-foreign-countries/2016-05-11-herziene-guide-
for-international-casesof-child-abduction-to-foreign-
countries.pdf (“[T]he Convention does not apply to [Dutch 
Sint Maarten].”); Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
for 2015: Netherlands, U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.h
tm?year=2015&dlid=252883 (“[Netherlands] is a party to the 
1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction, but the convention does not apply to . . . 
[Dutch] Sint Maarten . . . .”). 
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Hague Convention (“concurrent habitual residence”6)?  We 
conclude that the text of the Convention does not permit 
concurrent habitual residence.  We therefore look to the 
ordinary meaning of the term “residence” and hold that the 
children were habitual residents only of the country in which 
they “lived”—Dutch Sint Maarten.  Because Dutch Sint 
Maarten does not recognize the Convention, the Convention 
does not apply to this case. 
 Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s 
judgments and dismiss the petition.  Because the District 
Court granted the petition as to A.D., we will also instruct the 
District Court to order that A.D. be returned to the United 
States forthwith. 
                                              
 6 The authorities on this issue are inconsistent in their 
usage of terminology.  The phrases “concurrent habitual 
residence,” “alternating habitual residence,” and “dual 
habitual residence” are sometimes used interchangeably.  
However, “concurrent habitual residence” refers to a situation 
where a child is habitually resident in two countries at the 
same time, whereas “alternating habitual residence” refers to 
a distinct situation where a child is moved in between two 
countries on a regular basis (known as “shuttle custody”) such 
that her habitual residence alternates between those countries.  
“Dual habitual residence” can be used to refer to either or 
both situations.  For the sake of clarity, we will refer to the 
phrases “concurrent habitual residence” and “alternating 
habitual residence” in the manner just described and will not 
use the term “dual habitual residence.” 
 
6 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL 
HISTORY 
A. Factual Background7 
 The parties’ dispute in this case revolves around two 
children—A.D. and J.D.  A.D. is the biological son of 
Petitioner Maurice Marie Didon (“Didon”) and Respondent 
Alicia Dominguez Castillo (“Dominguez”), and J.D. is the 
biological daughter of Dominguez from a prior relationship.  
Dominguez moved to Dutch Sint Maarten in 2007, leaving 
J.D. behind in the Dominican Republic.  Dominguez 
subsequently met Didon in 2008 and moved into his 
apartment in Dutch Sint Maarten in 2009.  On November 3, 
2010, A.D. was born, and shortly thereafter, in 2011, J.D. 
moved into the Dutch Sint Maarten apartment. 
 After J.D. moved in, Didon and Dominguez petitioned 
the French consulate to change J.D.’s birth certificate to list 
Didon as her father.  That petition was granted and a new 
birth certificate was issued for J.D. listing Didon as her father 
and Dominguez as her mother.  Although Didon characterizes 
this process as an “adoption” of J.D., “the parties never 
appeared before a court or otherwise formally engaged in the 
adoption process.”  App. vol. I at 6. 
                                              
 7 The following facts are taken from the District 
Court’s factual findings and are unchallenged by the parties 
unless otherwise noted. 
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 The family resided at the Dutch Sint Maarten 
apartment for the next three years.  Throughout this time 
period, although the family resided in Dutch Sint Maarten,8 it 
was “primarily oriented” to French Saint Martin “where 
Didon worked, and where the children attended school,[9] 
went to doctor’s appointments, etc.”  App. vol. I at 5.  
“Further, the family’s administrative affairs, such as the 
children’s insurance, were managed [in French Saint 
Martin].”  App. vol. I at 14.   
 In July 2014, Didon filed a custody action in French 
civil court seeking full custody of A.D. and J.D.  Dominguez 
was neither served with papers in the action nor otherwise 
notified of the custody proceeding.  During the pendency of 
                                              
 8 The District Court acknowledged that Didon owned a 
two-unit apartment building in French Saint Martin, which 
the family used both as a rental unit for tourists and for 
“personal use.”  App. vol. I at 14−15.  However, on the basis 
of testimony that the family “did not reside there permanently 
and only stayed there together five or six times per year,” the 
District Court concluded that the apartment was not “the 
parties’ primary residence” and was only used 
“periodic[ally].”  App. vol. I at 15 n.13. 
 9 Dominguez argues that only J.D. attended school in 
French Saint Martin, but the record contains evidence 
suggesting that A.D. attended school in French Saint Martin 
as well.  See App. vol. II at 141.  The District Court’s finding 
that both children attended school in French Saint Martin was 
not clearly erroneous. 
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the action, Dominguez informed Didon that she would be 
taking A.D. and J.D. to New York City on August 27, 2014 to 
attend her sister’s wedding.  Dominguez advised Didon that 
she and the children would return on September 7, 2014, and 
showed Didon three round-trip airline tickets from Dutch Sint 
Maarten to New York City to that effect. 
 On September 6, 2014, Didon contacted the children’s 
school to inform the school that J.D. would be absent due to a 
vacation to the United States.  Didon was told by school 
administrators that the school was not expecting J.D. to return 
because Dominguez had disenrolled the children.  Didon 
immediately contacted the police, who were able to get in 
contact with Dominguez by telephone on the same day.  
Didon claims that Dominguez promised on the call to return 
with the children the following day, as planned, but 
Dominguez claims not to have made such a promise.  
Dominguez did not return with the children on September 7. 
 In the children’s absence, Didon continued to pursue 
his French custody action and, on March 23, 2015, the French 
court granted full custody of A.D. and J.D. to Didon in an ex 
parte order.10  At the same time, Didon had hired a private 
investigator to look for the children and, in the summer of 
                                              
 10 Dominguez alleges that Didon procured this 
judgment by fraud.  She argues that we should deny his 
petition because he seeks equitable relief and comes before us 
with unclean hands.  However, we have expressly rejected the 
application of the unclean hands doctrine to Hague 
Convention petitions.  See Karpenko v. Leendertz, 619 F.3d 
259, 265 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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2015, the investigator located them in Hazleton, 
Pennsylvania. 
B. Procedural History 
 On August 13, 2015, Didon filed the instant Hague 
Convention petition in the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
seeking the return of A.D. and J.D. to French Saint Martin.11  
Didon also filed an ex parte motion seeking a temporary 
restraining order and an expedited hearing on the merits of his 
petition.   
 On August 14, 2015, the District Court held an ex 
parte telephone hearing with Didon’s counsel, after which it 
entered an order directing the U.S. Marshals Service to serve 
a copy of the order and petition on Dominguez, and to 
confiscate the passports and other travel documents of 
Dominguez, A.D., and J.D.  The District Court also granted 
Didon’s request for a temporary restraining order and 
enjoined Dominguez from removing A.D. and J.D. from the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania pending a hearing on the 
merits of the petition.  The District Court subsequently held 
hearings in the matter on September 2 and September 22, 
during which both parties presented testimony and other 
evidence. 
 On September 24, 2015, the District Court rendered 
judgment, granting Didon’s petition as to A.D. and denying 
                                              
 11 Under ICARA, a petition must be filed with a court 
“authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in the place where the 
child is located at the time the petition is filed.”  22 U.S.C. 
§ 9003(b). 
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the petition as to J.D.  The District Court began by fixing the 
date of retention as September 7, 2014—the day on which 
Dominguez had promised to return from the United States 
with the children.  It then examined where the children were 
habitually resident prior to that date.  It observed: “The 
parties’ testimony reveals that the border [between Dutch Sint 
Maarten and French Saint Martin] is so permeable as to be 
evanescent, and is regularly and readily traversed by residents 
and travelers alike. . . . [F]or most purposes of its residents’ 
daily life, the island is essentially undivided.”  App. vol. I at 
13.  It highlighted testimony about the family’s extensive 
contacts with both countries and concluded that “the record 
facts, in addition to the nature of the island itself, support a 
finding that J.D. and A.D. were habitual residents of both 
[Dutch] Sint Maarten and [French] Saint Martin.”  App. vol. I 
at 15.   
 In support of its conclusion, the District Court 
distinguished cases holding that a child may have only one 
habitual residence country at a time as “deciding whether the 
child had abandoned a prior habitual residence in favor of a 
new one.”  App. vol. I at 15.  It also invoked dicta from 
Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) referencing 
“the rare situation where someone consistently splits time 
more or less [evenly] between two locations, so as to retain 
alternating habitual residences in each.”  App. vol. I at 16 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mozes, 239 F.3d 
at 1075 n.17). 
 The District Court bifurcated the remainder of its 
analysis.  With respect to A.D., the District Court noted that 
the parties were in agreement that Didon had custody rights 
under French law because A.D. is his biological son.  The 
District Court also noted that Didon was exercising those 
11 
 
custody rights until Dominguez took A.D. to the United 
States.  Because Dominguez retained A.D. from his habitual 
residence in violation of Didon’s custody rights under French 
law, the District Court concluded that A.D. was “wrongfully” 
retained under the Hague Convention and granted the petition 
as to A.D. 
 With respect to J.D., the District Court began by 
observing that Didon did not have custody rights over J.D. 
through adoption because his purported “adoption” did not 
satisfy the requirements of French law to vest custody.  The 
District Court also rejected Didon’s argument that the French 
court’s ex parte custody order vested him with custody rights 
over J.D. at the time of retention because “the judgment was 
not issued until more than six months after the alleged 
wrongful retention date of September 7, [2014].”  App. vol. I 
at 19.  Because Didon did not have custody rights over J.D. 
under French law at the time of retention, the District Court 
concluded that J.D. was not “wrongfully” retained under the 
Convention and denied the petition as to J.D. 
 Dominguez filed a motion for an emergency stay of 
the District Court’s judgment with respect to A.D. pending 
appeal, which the District Court denied without comment on 
September 25, 2015.  A.D. was subsequently transferred from 
Dominguez to Didon on that same day.12  Didon and 
                                              
 12 The result of our decision today is that A.D. must be 
transferred back to the United States from Saint Martin.  After 
that transfer, A.D. will have been relocated between Saint 
Martin and the United States three times in two years.  We are 
naturally concerned that these multiple relocations of the 
child have been or will be detrimental to his well-being.  See 
Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1026 (2013). 
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Dominguez filed cross-appeals from the District Court’s 
judgments with respect to J.D. and A.D., respectively. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over the Hague 
Convention petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 22 
U.S.C. § 9003(a).  We have jurisdiction over the parties’ 
cross-appeals of the District Court’s judgments pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
                                                                                                     
 Accordingly, we reiterate here that a district court 
issuing a return order in a Hague Convention matter should 
seriously consider the possibility of staying that order 
pending appeal.  While we do not endorse “[r]outine stays” in 
such matters, a district court should carefully consider the 
traditional stay factors when “considering whether to stay a 
return order”: 
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong 
showing that he is likely to succeed on the 
merits; (2) whether the applicant will be 
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether 
issuance of the stay will substantially injure the 
other parties interested in the proceeding; and 
(4) where the public interest lies. 
Id. at 1027 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nken 
v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)). 
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 We review the District Court’s conclusions of law de 
novo and its factual findings for clear error.13  Karpenko, 619 
F.3d at 262−63.  Accordingly, we will uphold the District 
Court’s factual findings if its “account of the evidence is 
plausible in light of the record, even if . . . we would have 
weighed the evidence differently.”  Id. at 263 (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tsai-Yi 
Yang v. Fu-Chiang Tsui, 499 F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir. 2007)). 
III. ANALYSIS 
                                              
 13 Didon argues that the District Court’s determination 
that the children were concurrent habitual residents of Dutch 
Sint Maarten and French Saint Martin is a factual finding that 
we must review for clear error.  However, Didon’s argument 
conflates the related, but distinct, questions presented by this 
case. 
 The determination of where a child is habitually 
resident is a mixed question of law and fact.  Feder v. Evans-
Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 n.9 (3d Cir. 1995).  “On such 
questions we employ a mixed standard of review, accepting 
[a] district court’s historical or narrative facts unless they are 
clearly erroneous, but exercising plenary review of the court’s 
choice of and interpretation of legal precepts and its 
application of those precepts to the facts.”  Id.  Under this 
standard, the question of whether a child may have concurrent 
habitual residence countries under the Hague Convention 
“defines the concept of habitual residence,” id., and therefore 
is a classic legal question over which we exercise plenary 
review. 
 
14 
 
 The Hague Convention was designed to “deter parents 
from engaging in international forum shopping in custody 
cases.”  Karpenko, 619 F.3d at 263 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Tsai-Yi Yang, 499 F.3d at 270).  To that 
end, it provides a return remedy that seeks to “restore the 
status quo” that existed prior to the “wrongful” removal or 
retention14 of a child from her habitual residence country.  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tsai-Yi Yang, 499 
F.3d at 270).  The Convention deems a removal or retention 
to be “wrongful” where: 
a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed 
to a person, an institution or any other body, 
either jointly or alone, under the law of the State 
in which the child was habitually resident 
immediately before the removal or retention; 
and 
b) at the time of removal or retention those 
rights were actually exercised, either jointly or 
alone, or would have been so exercised but for 
the removal or retention. 
Hague Convention, supra, at art. 3. 
                                              
 14 Because Didon permitted Dominguez to travel to the 
United States with the children, Didon has alleged only a 
wrongful retention of the children.  See Feder, 63 F.3d at 220 
n.4.  Therefore, we will not discuss wrongful removal. 
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 In evaluating whether the petitioning parent has made 
that showing, a court must determine:  (1) when the removal 
or retention took place; (2) where the child was habitually 
resident immediately prior to the removal or retention; (3) 
whether the removal or retention violated the petitioning 
parent’s custody rights under the law of the child’s habitual 
residence; and (4) whether the petitioning parent was actually 
exercising those custody rights at the time of the removal or 
retention, or would have exercised those rights but for the 
removal or retention.15  Karpenko, 619 F.3d at 263. 
 In this case, we need only examine the second question 
(habitual residence), which proves dispositive.  The District 
Court concluded that the Hague Convention permits the 
children to have concurrent habitual residence in Dutch Sint 
                                              
 15 “Once the petitioner meets its initial burden, the 
respondent may oppose the child’s return by proving one of 
five affirmative defenses.”  Karpenko, 619 F.3d at 263.  
Before the District Court, Dominguez unsuccessfully sought 
to invoke the affirmative defense that there is “a grave risk 
that [A.D.’s] return would expose him to physical or 
psychological harm or otherwise place [him] in an intolerable 
situation.”  Id. at 263 n.3.  Dominguez does not present any 
argument on this point on appeal and so has waived our 
consideration of the affirmative defense.  See Tsai-Yi Yang, 
499 F.3d at 269 n.9.  In any event, as the District Court 
concluded, the sketchy and sharply disputed evidence of 
Didon’s alleged abuse of A.D. does not approach the level of 
“clear and convincing evidence” required to prove the 
affirmative defense.  Karpenko, 619 F.3d at 263 n.3. 
 
16 
 
Maarten and French Saint Martin.  We conclude that the 
Hague Convention does not permit concurrent habitual 
residence and hold that the children were habitually resident 
only in the country in which they lived—Dutch Sint Maarten.  
Because Dutch Sint Maarten does not recognize the Hague 
Convention,16 the Convention does not apply to this case.  See 
Hague Convention, supra, at arts. 4 & 35; Karkkainen v. 
Kovalchuk, 445 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 2006); Legal Analysis, 
supra, at 10504 (“[T]he Convention may be invoked only 
where the child was habitually resident in a Contracting State 
and taken to or retained in another Contracting State.”).  
Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed. 
A. The Hague Convention Does Not Permit Concurrent 
Habitual Residence 
 In determining whether the Hague Convention permits 
concurrent habitual residence, we begin our analysis with the 
text of the treaty.  See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 10 (2010) 
(“The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a 
statute, begins with its text.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 
(2008))).  As with a statute, where the text of a treaty is 
unambiguous, we apply the treaty as written and the analysis 
is complete.  See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 
122, 134−35 (1989); United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 
1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 We conclude that the text of the Hague Convention 
unambiguously contemplates that a child may have only one 
habitual residence country at a time.  Rather than referencing 
                                              
 16 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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“a State” of habitual residence or “the States” of habitual 
residence, the Convention repeatedly refers to “the State” of 
habitual residence.  See, e.g., Hague Convention, supra, at 
Preamble (“The States signatory to the present 
Convention, . . . Desiring to . . . establish procedures to ensure 
the[] prompt return [of children] to the State of their habitual 
residence . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at art. 3 (“The . . . 
retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where . . . it 
is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person . . . 
under the law of the State in which the child was habitually 
resident immediately before the . . . retention . . . .” (emphasis 
added)); see also 22 U.S.C. § 9003(f)(1) (“[T]he term 
‘authorities’, as used in article 15 of the Convention to refer 
to the authorities of the state of the habitual residence of a 
child . . . .” (emphasis added)).  Such language is not 
susceptible to any construction whereby a child may have 
more than one habitual residence country at a time.  See In 
Marriage of Hanbury-Brown (1996) 130 FLR 252, 285 
(Austl.)17; Rhona Schuz, Policy Considerations in 
                                              
 17 “In interpreting any treaty, ‘[t]he opinions of our 
sister signatories . . . are entitled to considerable weight.’”  
Abbott, 560 U.S. at 16 (alterations in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. 
v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999)).  “The 
principle applies with special force here, for Congress has 
directed that ‘uniform international interpretation of the 
Convention’ is part of the Convention’s framework.”  Id. 
(quoting former 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(3)(B)).  Accordingly, 
we consider the “views of other contracting states,” as 
expressed in “international case law,” in interpreting the 
Hague Convention.  Id. 
18 
 
Determining the Habitual Residence of a Child and the 
Relevance of Context, 11 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y 101, 126 
(2001); cf. Linda Silberman, Interpreting the Hague 
Abduction Convention:  In Search of a Global Jurisprudence, 
38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1049, 1067 n.78 (2005). 
 This textual conclusion finds support in the 
Convention’s Explanatory Report, which is “generally 
recognized as ‘the official history and commentary on the 
Convention.’”  Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 540, 546 n.3 
(3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Legal Analysis, supra, at 10503); 
accord Feder, 63 F.3d at 221 n.7.  The Explanatory Report 
similarly makes clear that a child may have only one habitual 
residence country at a time:  
The practical application of [the wrongful 
retention] principle requires that the signatory 
States be convinced that they belong, despite 
their differences, to the same legal community 
within which the authorities of each State 
acknowledge that the authorities of one of 
them—those of the child’s habitual residence—
are in principle best placed to decide upon 
questions of custody and access.   
Elisa Pérez-Vera, Explanatory Report ¶ 34, in 3 Hague 
Conference on Private International Law, Acts and 
Documents of the Fourteenth Session 434–35 (1982) 
(emphasis added). 
 Thus, it is unsurprising that the overwhelming majority 
of United States cases that have addressed the issue have 
concluded that a child may have only one habitual residence 
country at a time.  See, e.g., Sorenson v. Sorenson, 559 F.3d 
19 
 
871, 873 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[A] person may have only one 
habitual residence.” (quoting Silverman v. Silverman, 338 
F.3d 886, 898 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc))); Robert v. Tesson, 
507 F.3d 981, 989 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); Miller v. Miller, 
240 F.3d 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2001) (same).18  Foreign cases 
addressing the issue have reached the same conclusion.  See, 
e.g., In Marriage of Hanbury-Brown (1996) 130 FLR 252, 
285−86 (Austl.) (“[T]he notion of [concurrent] habitual 
residence is simply inconsistent with the wording of the 
Convention, and with all known judicial pronouncements 
upon it.”); Kaniuch v. Pontes, 2004 CarswellAlta 1922, para. 
14 (Can. Alta. Q.B.) (WL); Re V (Abduction: Habitual 
Residence) (1995) 2 FLR 992, 1001−02 (Eng.); Cameron v. 
Cameron (1996) SC 17 (Scot.).19 
 Courts have not strayed from this bedrock principle 
even where a child has meaningful connections to two 
                                              
 18 Accord Panteleris v. Panteleris, 30 F. Supp. 3d 674, 
682 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (same); Blanc v. Morgan, 721 F. Supp. 
2d 749, 760 (W.D. Tenn. 2010) (same); In re Morris, 55 F. 
Supp. 2d 1156, 1161 (D. Colo. 1999) (same); Freier v. 
Freier, 969 F. Supp. 436, 440 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (same); cf. 
Tsai-Yi Yang, 499 F.3d at 272 (“[A] child’s prior habitual 
residence must be effectively abandoned by the shared intent 
of the parents for her to acquire a new habitual residence.”); 
Whiting, 391 F.3d at 550 (same). 
 19 Accord Maharaj v. Maharajh, 2011 ONSC 525, para. 
13 (Can.); Wilson v. Huntley, 2005 CarswellOnt 1606, para. 
57 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL); S.-C. (S.) v. C. (G.), 2003 
CarswellQue 2223, para. 53 (Can. Que. Ct. Sup.) (WL); 
Dickson v. Dickson (1990) SCLR 692 (Scot.). 
20 
 
countries.  For example, in shuttle custody situations, a child 
spends a roughly equal amount of time in two countries 
because her parents, who live in different countries, agree to 
split custody.  See supra note 6.  In a recent shuttle custody 
case, rather than considering the possibility of concurrent 
habitual residence, the Ninth Circuit adopted the theory of 
alternating habitual residence whereby a child’s habitual 
residence alternates between those two countries.20  
Valenzuela v. Michel, 736 F.3d 1173, 1178−79 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
                                              
 20 As the Ninth Circuit noted, foreign cases have 
similarly adopted the theory of alternating habitual residence.  
See In re CL (a minor) and In re the Child Abduction and 
Custody Act 1985; JS v. CL (unreported High Court N. Ir. 
Aug. 25, 1998) (“[T]he child was habitually resident in 
whichever jurisdiction he was living for a particular week.”); 
Maharaj v. Maharajh, 2011 ONSC 525, para. 13 (Can.); 
Wilson v. Huntley, 2005 CarswellOnt 1606, para. 32 (Can. 
Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL); In re A. (1998) 1 FLR 497 (Eng.); Re 
V (Abduction: Habitual Residence) (1995) 2 FLR 992, 
1001−02 (Eng.); cf. Watson v. Jamieson (1998) SLT 180 
(Scot.). 
 Although we need not examine the propriety of 
alternating habitual residence in this case, we note that 
alternating habitual residence comports with the text of the 
Hague Convention because, under that theory, a child has 
only one habitual residence country at any given time. 
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 In concluding that concurrent habitual residence is 
possible under the Convention, the District Court relied on an 
earlier Ninth Circuit decision—Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 
1067 (9th Cir. 2001).  In Mozes, the Ninth Circuit observed in 
dicta that, although “the view held by many courts” is that “a 
person can only have one habitual residence at a time under 
the Convention,” “[t]he exception would be the rare situation 
where someone consistently splits time more or less evenly 
between two locations, so as to retain alternating habitual 
residences in each.”  Id. at 1075 n.17 (emphasis added).  The 
Court went on to observe that, if “[a] child . . . spent regularly 
alternating periods with each parent,” the child “might . . . 
acquire[] dual habitual residences.”  Id. at 1083 n.50 
(emphasis added).  In support of its observations, the Court 
cited to a commentator that advocates for the possibility of 
concurrent habitual residence—Paul R. Beaumont & Peter E. 
McEleavy, The Hague Convention on International Child 
Abduction 110 (1999).   
 After carefully reviewing Mozes, it is not clear to us 
whether the Ninth Circuit was endorsing concurrent habitual 
residence or alternating habitual residence in that case.21  The 
Ninth Circuit’s later opinion in Valenzuela appears to 
interpret Mozes to have endorsed alternating habitual 
residence.  See Valenzuela, 736 F.3d at 1177−79.  However, 
                                              
 21 We are particularly confused by the Ninth Circuit’s 
statement that the “exception” to a child having “one habitual 
residence at a time” would be “alternating habitual 
residences.”  Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1075 n.17.  In an alternating 
habitual residence scenario, the child’s habitual residence 
alternates between two countries such that the child does, in 
fact, have only one habitual residence country at a time. 
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to the extent that Mozes can be read to support concurrent 
habitual residence, we reject that interpretation of the Hague 
Convention as inconsistent with the Convention’s 
unambiguous text. 
 We are mindful that, in cases where a child has 
meaningful connections to two countries, the determination of 
which is the child’s habitual residence may sometimes be 
difficult.  However, that is the determination required by the 
text of the Hague Convention.22  Courts are permitted only to 
interpret existing treaty provisions—not re-draft those 
provisions.  See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224, 
                                              
 22 Permitting concurrent habitual residence would also 
introduce a fundamental problem into the structure of the 
treaty—in cases where the custody laws of two concurrent 
habitual residence countries conflict, how would a court 
determine which country’s laws to apply in determining 
whether a wrongful retention had taken place?  Given that the 
Convention clearly contemplates a child having only one 
habitual residence country at a time, it provides no choice of 
law rule for such a situation.  But see Beaumont & McEleavy, 
supra, at 110 (suggesting a theoretical solution to this 
problem). 
 Despite finding that the children in this case were 
habitually resident in both Dutch Sint Maarten and French 
Saint Martin at the same time, the District Court avoided this 
choice of law problem by analyzing Didon’s custody rights 
only under French law.  It did not provide any justification for 
ignoring Dutch custody law, which would have equal 
application to the wrongful retention inquiry in a concurrent 
habitual residence scenario. 
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1235 (2014).  “[T]o alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by 
inserting any clause, whether small or great, important or 
trivial, would be on our part an usurpation of power, and not 
an exercise of judicial functions.  It would be to make, and 
not to construe a treaty.”23  Chan, 490 U.S. at 135 (alteration 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re 
The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 22).  Therefore, 
remaining faithful to the text of the treaty, we hold that a 
child may have only one habitual residence country at a time 
under the Hague Convention. 
B. The Children’s Habitual Residence Country is Dutch 
Sint Maarten 
 Given our conclusion that the Convention does not 
permit concurrent habitual residence, we must now determine 
in which country the children were habitually resident—
Dutch Sint Maarten or French Saint Martin. 
 The Hague Convention does not define the phrase 
“habitual residence.”  See Feder, 63 F.3d at 222.  However, 
we interpret the words of treaties in accordance with their 
ordinary meaning.  See Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 
                                              
 23 This principle holds true even if one views the 
Convention’s failure to address concurrent habitual residence 
as a “gap” or “oversight” rather than a conscious choice that a 
child may have only one habitual residence country at a time.  
See Chan, 490 U.S. at 135 (“Neither can this Court supply 
a casus omissus in a treaty, any more than in a law.” (quoting 
In re The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 22 (1821))). 
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40 (1931); Abbott, 560 U.S. at 11; In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 
F.3d 999, 1010 (9th Cir. 2009).  “Habitual residence” is 
defined as “[a] person’s customary place of residence.”  
Habitual Residence, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
We therefore look to the ordinary meaning of the term 
“residence,” which is incorporated into the phrase “habitual 
residence” as a matter of language and definition.  See Koch 
v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 712 (7th Cir. 2006); Guzzo v. 
Cristofano, 719 F.3d 100, 106 & n.5 (2d Cir. 2013); Simcox v. 
Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 602 (6th Cir. 2007).  “Residence” is 
defined as “[t]he place where one actually lives,” or, put 
another way, where one has a home.  Residence, Black’s Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); Residence, Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary Online, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/residence (last visited Sept. 23, 
2016); see Live, Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/live (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2016). 
 In our view, it would disregard the ordinary meaning 
of the term “residence” to find that a child is habitually 
resident in a country in which she has not “lived.”  Consider, 
for example, a child whose home is in New Jersey but who 
travels to New York each day to attend elementary school and 
engage in various other daily activities.  On those facts, 
regardless of how much time the child spent each day in New 
York, an ordinary person would not say that the child is a 
“resident” of New York—a state in which she does not live.  
See In re B. Del C.S.B., 559 F.3d at 1011.  Indeed, the parties 
have not pointed us to any case in which a child was found to 
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be habitually resident in a country in which she had not 
lived.24 
 Although drawing such a distinction between two 
relevant countries may seem somewhat arbitrary, it is the 
result of a difficult choice of law question faced by the 
drafters of the Hague Convention:  how to determine which 
country’s custody law to apply where two countries have a 
potential interest in the application of their own custody law.  
The drafters of the Convention decided to resolve this 
question by according priority to the country of “habitual 
residence,” believing authorities in that country to be “in 
principle best placed to decide upon questions of custody and 
access.”  Pérez-Vera, supra, ¶ 34 at 434–35.  Such 
distinctions are common in conflict of laws analyses, which 
often resolve difficult choice of law questions by reference to 
rules viewed as predictable and easy-to-apply.  See generally 
Kermit Roosevelt, Conflict of Laws 3−32 (2010) (examining 
the territorial theory of the Restatement (First) of Conflict of 
Laws under which the law of the location of a legal event 
generally governs).25  In following the ordinary meaning of 
                                              
 24 We note that, in all our Hague Convention cases in 
which we examined a district court’s determination as to 
where a child was habitually resident, the child had lived in 
the purported habitual residence countries.  See Tsai-Yi Yang, 
499 F.3d at 266−67; Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 285−86; In re 
Application of Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 386 (3d Cir. 2006); 
Whiting, 391 F.3d at 542−43; Feder, 63 F.3d at 218−20. 
 25 The drafters of the Hague Convention could have 
adopted, instead of a “habitual residence” rule, an interest 
analysis standard, under which a court would examine the 
interest of the relevant countries in the application of their 
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the term “residence” and requiring that a child have lived in a 
country for a finding of habitual residence, we are honoring 
the choice of law rule provided by the drafters of the 
Convention. 
 The adoption of a “living” requirement for habitual 
residence also fits harmoniously within existing habitual 
residence jurisprudence.  Such a requirement is consistent 
with principles of habitual residence to which we have looked 
in the past.  See Whiting, 391 F.3d at 547 (“All that is 
necessary is that the purpose of living where one does has a 
sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as 
settled.” (emphasis added) (quoting Feder, 63 F.3d at 223)); 
In re Application of Adan, 437 F.3d at 392 (same); Delvoye v. 
Lee, 329 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Where a child is born 
while his . . . mother is temporarily present in a country other 
than that of her habitual residence . . . the child will normally 
have no habitual residence until living in a country on a 
footing of some stability.” (first alteration in original) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Dr. E.M. Clive, The Concept of 
Habitual Residence, The Jurid. Rev. part 3, 138, 146 (1997)).  
It is also consistent with cases from other courts.  See Guzzo, 
719 F.3d at 106 (defining habitual residence as “the place 
where [a child] usually or customarily lives” (emphasis 
                                                                                                     
own custody law.  See generally Roosevelt, supra, at 41–79.  
While such an approach might appear more appealing in this 
particular case given the meaningful connections of the 
children to both Dutch Sint Maarten and French Saint Martin, 
the drafters did not choose this choice of law approach and 
we must respect their decision. 
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added)); Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912, 921 (8th Cir. 
2010) (observing that an agreement between two parents 
purporting to set a child’s habitual residence in a country 
where the child has “never lived” would be ineffectual).  
Moreover, in a typical Hague Convention case where a child 
is moved from one country to another and a court must 
determine which is her habitual residence, see Valenzuela, 
736 F.3d at 1177−78, the child has lived in both countries and 
so the requirement would be satisfied no matter which 
country the court determines to be the child’s habitual 
residence. 
 We therefore conclude that a child must have lived in a 
country before that country can be considered her habitual 
residence under the Hague Convention.  We take this 
opportunity to outline the analytical structure that courts 
should use in determining a child’s habitual residence 
country. 
 In answering the question of where a child is 
habitually resident, we have traditionally followed several 
principles.  “The inquiry into a child’s habitual residence is a 
fact-intensive determination that cannot be reduced to a 
predetermined formula and necessarily varies with the 
circumstances of each case.”  Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 291.  
As a general matter, a child’s habitual residence is “the place 
where [the child] has been physically present for an amount 
of time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a degree 
of settled purpose from the child’s perspective.”  Baxter v. 
Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Feder, 63 F.3d at 224).  “This 
approach considers a child’s experience in and contacts with 
her surroundings, focusing on whether she ‘develop[ed] a 
certain routine and acquire[d] a sense of environmental 
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normalcy’ by ‘form[ing] meaningful connections with the 
people and places [she] encountered’ in a country prior to the 
retention date.”  Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 292 (alterations in 
original) (quoting Whiting, 391 F.3d at 550–51).  We also 
“consider the ‘parents’ present, shared intentions regarding 
their child’s presence [in a particular location],’” Tsai-Yi 
Yang, 499 F.3d at 272 (alteration in original) (quoting Baxter, 
423 F.3d at 368), especially “[w]hen a child is too young to 
have an intent regarding her habitual residence,” In re 
Application of Adan, 437 F.3d at 392. 
 Within this framework, the living requirement 
logically comes before any question of where a child is 
“acclimatized” or the “shared intentions” of her parents—it is 
a prerequisite to a finding of habitual residence.  A court 
adjudicating a Hague Convention petition should first ask 
whether the child at issue has lived in the purported habitual 
residence countries.  If that requirement is satisfied for those 
countries, the court should then engage in the fact-intensive 
inquiry laid out in the preceding paragraph.  Viewed in this 
way, the living test is used to determine whether a child has 
multiple residence countries, and the fact-intensive inquiry is 
used to determine, among those residence countries, which is 
the child’s habitual residence. 
 In this case, although the children attended school in 
French Saint Martin, it is clear that the country in which they 
lived (i.e., had a home) was Dutch Sint Maarten.26  Because 
                                              
 26 As we observe supra note 8, the District Court found 
that Didon owned a two-unit apartment building in French 
Saint Martin.  However, the testimony credited by the District 
Court made clear that the family stayed there together only 
five or six times a year and so the children did not live in 
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there is only one country in which the children lived, our 
analysis is complete and we need not proceed to the fact-
intensive inquiry.  We hold that the children were habitual 
residents of Dutch Sint Maarten alone.  Because Dutch Sint 
Maarten does not recognize the Hague Convention,27 the 
Convention does not apply to this case and the petition must 
be dismissed.28  See Hague Convention, supra, at arts. 4 & 
35. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s judgments and dismiss the petition.  We will also 
instruct the District Court to order that A.D. be returned to the 
United States forthwith.  The Clerk of Court will issue the 
mandate immediately. 
                                                                                                     
French Saint Martin.  Indeed, the District Court found that 
“[p]rior to Dominguez’s departure with the children, the 
family unit had been living together [in Dutch Sint Maarten] 
since A.D.’s birth in 2010.”  App. vol. I at 21. 
 27 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 28 Our dismissal of the petition is not limited to 
Dominguez’s appeal of the District Court’s grant of the 
petition as to A.D.  Because the Hague Convention does not 
apply to this case, our dismissal must also extend to Didon’s 
appeal of the District Court’s denial of the petition as to J.D. 
